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Abstract The paper considers the legal tools that have been developed in 
German pharmaceutical regulation as a result of the precautionary attitude 
inaugurated by the Contergan decision (1970). These tools are (i) the notion of 
―well-founded suspicion‖, which attenuates the requirements for safety 
intervention by relaxing the requirement of a proved causal connection between 
danger and source, and the introduction of (ii) the reversal of proof burden in 
liability norms. The paper focuses on the first and proposes seeing the 
precautionary principle as an instance of the requirement that one should 
maximise expected utility. In order to maximise expected utility certain 
probabilities are required and it is argued that objective Bayesianism offers the 
most plausible means to determine the optimal decision in cases where evidence 
supports diverging choices.   
 
 
1. Precautionary attitudes in response to uncertain knowledge  
 
Historically, the precautionary principle arose in response to the lessons learnt 
from environmental disasters and injuries to human and animal health caused by 
chemical compounds (x-ray radioactivity, benzene, asbestos, PCB, halocarbons, 
DES sulphur dioxide, etc.). These tragedies could have been avoided if signals of 
alarm had been taken more seriously. This hindsight, together with the increasing 
awareness of the unpredictability of environmental and health effects created by 
the chemical industry, stimulated the development of juridical instruments for the 
management of lack of knowledge—see, for instance, the work done by the 
European Environmental Agency (2001). These instruments are meant to be 
able to enlarge the powers of intervention for authorities against sources of 
possible harm, even in the absence of scientific proof of a causal link. Causal link 
is the central notion in this context because it is the basis both for action on the 
one hand, and for responsibility attribution on the other hand.  
 
The first programmatic documents advocating administrative intervention before 




North Sea pollution. The first Conference for the Protection of the North Seas 
(Bremen, 1st November, 1984) asserts that the States ―must not wait for proof of 
harmful effects before taking actions‖; the second Conference (London, 24-25 
November, 1987) makes reference to the precautionary attitude and insists that 
―[...] a precautionary approach is necessary which requires to control input of 
such substances even before a causal link has been established by absolutely 
clear scientific evidence‖ (art. VII). The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, 
ratified the precautionary principle and extended it to the global environment. The 
key feature of the precautionary principle thereby ratified was the reversal of the 
burden of proof between intervening authority and potentially polluting agent. It is 
not the authority that must demonstrate that some human activities cause serious 
harm to the environment in order to be allowed to adopt adequate preventive 
measure; on the contrary, in order to postpone these measures, it must be 
proved that these activities do not cause any serious harm to the environment 
(principle 15).  
 
In general, the precautionary principle responds to the needs of a complex 
society where uncertainty is endemic. Dupuy (2004: 80) even uses the term 
―radical uncertainty‖ (see also Tallacchini, 2005 and 2008 on this point). Science 
is called on to accomplish two interconnected tasks. The first is the traditional 
endeavour to increase knowledge about reality and its physical, chemical, 
biological principles; the second one is the prediction of the effects that the 
applications derived from this knowledge produce on the environment, as well as 
human and animal health (see for instance toxicological sciences). This second 
task is enormously more complex than the first; in fact, by studying the 
mechanisms of a phenomenon, the scientist focuses on a particular aspect of 
reality and on the potential consequences that technological interventions can 
produce (jointly or individually) on the environment. Such effects are by and large 
unpredictable for two reasons.  First, nature is an integrated system where any 
―external‖ action can produce domino effects at any level; second, it is practically 
unfeasible to exhaustively detect all dependencies, independencies and 
interference relationships working in nature. Therefore, the greater the progress 
in science, the exponentially greater the uncertainty generated by lack of 
knowledge about the potential effects of its technological applications. Not only 
sociologists (Beck, 1986), but also ethicists (Jonas, 1979), and philosophers of 
science (Hacking, 1986) have emphasised a new epistemological era where the 
unknown and lack of information should turn into topics of research on their own.  
 
In the pharmaceutical context, the multiplicity and sophistication of medical 
technologies has reached such a level that the term ―medicalization of society‖ 
has been coined in order to describe the pervasiveness of health care at all 
societal levels (Zola, 1972; Domenighetti, 2005). After a first phase of unlimited 
confidence in medical progress, a cautious attitude followed the numerous 
pharmaceutical scandals that have marked the history of pharmacology. For 
instance, the tranquillizer Contergan© (thalidomide), marketed in Germany 




children—mainly produced by drug inducted phocomelia—and fatally injured 
2500 people. This and other tragedies (see the Cronassial© case in Germany, 
but also worldwide marketed products such as Lipobay©, Vioxx©, and Bextra©) 
have contributed to enhance efforts towards the development of strict 
pharmaceutical safety regulation grounded in the criterion of the precautionary 
principle, which has led to an extension of care duties1 for dangerous entities, to 
an enlargement of intervention powers for the authority in charge, and to an 
amplification of the responsibility spheres for all concerned parties.2  
 
Notwithstanding these efforts directed at making cautious decisions to license 
drugs, cases of product retirement are more common than it may be thought, and 
proposals for improved monitoring systems are regularly advanced in the 
literature (see for instance Olivier and Montastruc 2006; Gassner and Reich-
Malter 2006; Laupacis et al. 2003; Waller and Evans 2006; Talbot and Nilsson, 
1998). As a matter of fact, it is not rare that pharmaceuticals are withdrawn from 
the market only too late, i.e. when extensive damage on the population of users 
has already been produced, which happened, for instance, with the above-
mentioned products. 
 
Various factors are at the origin of the discontent about how pharmaceutical 
decisions are taken both by responsible authorities and by the pharmaceutical 
industry (see for instance Reiss and Kitcher, 2008; Abraham and Davis, 2005; 
Abraham and Reed, 2001; Demortain, 2008): the complexity and inconsistency 
of data documenting drug efficacy and risks, the conflict of interest affecting the 
principal investigators of chemical entities and information deliverers 
(pharmaceutical sponsors), as well as time pressure in the approval procedure. 
Besides incentives and deterring instruments aimed at more transparent and 
safer pharmaceutical marketing (for instance through fiscal and financial 
regulation), formal instruments are needed in order to provide clear guidelines for 
the application of the legal norms developed in the area of safety protection and 
liability attribution.3 
 
2. The Contergan decision: origin of the precautionary attitude in 
pharmaceutical regulation 
 
Drugs have a Janus character as healing promise and poison at the same time. 
Debates about pharmaceutical products focus on one and the same principle: 
health as an individual and societal good, which drugs contribute both to promote 
and to endanger. Pharmaceutical regulation is the consequence of a growing 
awareness about the uncertainties surrounding the short, medium and long-term 
effects of chemical entities on the human organism.  
 
In the Sixties and Seventies, the trial and decision about Contergan set the basis 
for thorough reflection on the specific epistemic status of pharmaceutical 
knowledge in relation to the health risks posed by pharmaceutical products. The 




jurisprudence. The Contergan sentence was rather inconclusive with regard to 
imputing responsibilities and torts to the defendants: it ended up with a 
suspension of the trial by invoking § 153, abs 3 of the Strafprozessordnung – 
code of criminal procedure.4 Yet, it settled the future standard of conduct for 
pharmaceutical firms and their employees, thereby deeply changing the 
framework of responsibilities concerning the management, disclosure and 
possible prevention of pharmaceutical risks (see below). More recently, the IInd 
amendment law for compensation and the 2002 amendment to the German 
Medicines Act have further developed these sorts of considerations — more on 
this later on.  
 
The Contergan sentence (18 December 1970) contributed to the development of 
a precautionary attitude in pharmaceutical regulation by (i) increasing the 
responsibility scope for pharmaceutical sponsors through the introduction of strict 
liability for pharmaceutical products (until then, only tort liability required the 
assessment of negligence for responsibility attribution), and (ii) the principle of 
well-founded suspicion. The Contergan sentence establishes that, because 
positive proof of damage causality requires time, a large epidemiological basis, 
and can never be definitively assessed, a scientific proof of causality cannot be a 
valid criterion for determining the threshold of safety countermeasures:5   
 
Before a risk suspicion can be founded scientifically, enough time may pass as to 
produce damage in some consumer. During this vacillation time, the risk has to be 
undertaken by the pharmaceutical firm. Moreover, for the principle of inverse 
proportionality inherited from danger prevention regulation, even very low probable 
suspicions ask for timely countermeasures.  
 
In fact, the principle of inverse proportionality says that the higher the value 
assigned to the endangered good, the lower the probability of damage for 
approving intervention in its defence. General criteria for determining the 
opportunity and entity of safety actions are therefore:  
 
1. Severity of the suspected health damages: the more dangerous the drug 
is supposed to be, the earlier and prompter must the firm react to risk 
news concerning the product; 
2. The nature of the damage: irreversible damage requires quicker reactions 
than transitory disturbances; 
3. Side effects‘ frequency: the higher the observed frequency, the lower the 
suspicion needs to be in order to require safety countermeasures from the 
firm and/or the responsible authority; 
4. Therapeutic importance: the higher the interests of patient in the 
availability of the drug, the higher the permissible risk in allowing the drug 
to stay on the market. Therapeutic importance is determined by the lack of 





General safety measures include the adoption of warning actions towards the 
health professional and the end-user, the introduction of stricter prescription 
requirement, up to product retirement from the market.6  
 
3. Legal instruments of safety protection in the German Medicines Act 
 
The German Medicines Act (AMG) was the first law in western countries to 
translate the precautionary principle into concrete and legally binding norms. It 
was enacted in 1976 and is the result of the political debate that followed the 
Contergan tragedy and of the implementation of the European directives 
75/318/EEC and 75/319/EEC that also followed this pharmaceutical 
catastrophe.7  
 
Since 1976, AMG has undergone 14 amendments (the first one being ratified in 
2005, while a fifteenth amendment has been drafted in 2008-2009 and is still 
under approval).  The explicit purpose of AMG is the safety of drugs administered 
to the public through the establishment of criteria for the efficacy, quality and 
safety (―Unbedenklichkeit‖) evaluation of candidate drugs.8 The term 
―Unbedenklichkeit‖ refers to a safety judgment based on a risk/benefit 
assessment and is explicitly translated with the English term ―safety‖ in the 
European regulation (Scheu, 2003). It warrants for safety through drug approval, 
surveillance and liability norms. Risk prevention is managed through two control 
systems: drug approval and post-marketing control. It is worth noting that drug 
approval status is, by default, prohibition, with reserve of permission (―Verbot mit 
Erlaubnisvorbehalt‖). Liability norms also constitute an indirect incentive to safety 
beyond their principal compensatory aim. 
 
The precautionary principle is embodied in the AMG through two articles that 
received much attention in the legal literature: article 5 (prohibition of unsafe 
medicines: ―Verbot bedenklicher Arzneimittel‖) and article 84 (strict liability: 
―Gefährdungshaftung‖). In the following, we shall focus on article 5. 
 
Article 5 of AMG establishes safety criteria of drug circulation and withdrawal.9 
This norm stipulates prohibition of circulation for ―unsafe drugs‖ and provides a 
definition thereof: unsafe drugs are those for which there is well-founded 
suspicion that, by adequate use, will have damaging effects exceeding a 
tolerable threshold, according to the knowledge of the medical science (§ 5 II) on 
the basis of available scientific data.10  
 
This norm has three main components: 
1. The degree of causal association between risk and danger source 
required for intervention need not be certain (―well-founded suspicion‖); 
2. The level of causal association required for intervention is linked to the 
tolerance threshold, i.e. to the (un)balance between drug risk and benefit 




3. The tolerance threshold is established through reference to the state of the 
art of relevant medical knowledge. 
 
In sections 3.1 and 3.2 we will analyse the first two criteria. For the sake of 
argument, we will take the third component as unproblematic in this context. In 
sections 4 and 5 we will outline the general features of Bayesian epistemology 
and propose an objective Bayesian formalisation of the principle of well-founded 
suspicion. It is worth noting that although the legal setting considered here is the 
German one, risk management strategies are indeed very similar across different 
geographic areas such as Europe, U.S. and Japan. Indeed, responsible 
authorities and pharmacovigilance agencies are engaged in a continuous effort 
towards the harmonization of procedures and policy and of related legal tools 
(see the International Harmonization Conference11). Therefore, our arguments, 
although based on the German setting, are not strictly limited to it and can indeed 
contribute to these harmonization efforts. 
 
3.1 The principle of well founded suspicion  
 
Because drug reactions are idiosyncratic and depend on several environmental, 
biological, and genetic factors, knowledge about the effects of any drug grows 
with the number of its users. This means that even many years after approval, 
any pharmaceutical is still an ―experimental product‖, the information about which 
is neither exhaustive nor conclusive. As the Health Minister Dr. Focke declared in 
the ministerial statement for the provision of the German Medicines Act, drugs 
are products under constant testing (―Arzneimittel sind Produkte in 
Dauererprobung‖)12. The general recognition of the limited and fragmentary 
knowledge related to chemical and pharmaceutical technologies has contributed 
to the awareness that criteria for the management of partial and uncertain 
knowledge are needed.13 
 
The concept of ―well-founded suspicion‖ has been introduced into risk-
management regulation, in order to decrease the threshold level for signal 
detection and alerting measures.  This instrument represents an answer to the 
opacity associated with the pharmaceutical product: given that knowledge of 
possible unintended effects is limited and that the causal nexus can seldom be 
proven, waiting for the causal connection to be established before intervening 
would most times lead to late intervention and irreparable damage. The historical 
importance of the principle of well-founded suspicion is related to its fundamental 
role in moving pharmaceutical regulation from a ―danger avoidance‖ system into 
a ―risk prevention‖ (precautionary) system. 
 
Both systems function according to the principle of inverse proportionality: the 
more severe the expected damage, the lower the probability of its occurrence 
need be in order to intervene. The difference between the danger avoidance and 
the risk system lies in the kind of causal link between danger source and damage 




between danger source and damage needs to be established with certainty 
before the authority can intervene, in a risk prevention system it suffices to have 
a suspected causal connection between danger source and damage. Notice, 
moreover, that the principle of well-founded suspicion integrates the principle of 
inverse proportionality too: the higher the expected damage, the lower the 
probability of causal connection in order to require for intervention measures.14 In 
fact ―well-founded suspicion‖ is defined as ―hypothesis of causal connection‖ 
(Scheu, 2003: 113) and, as such, it is quantified in probabilistic terms, i.e. the 
probability P that the drug (D) causes harm (H) can be less than 1 
( ), that is less than certain. In other words, the more severe the 
harm, the lower  need be. 
 
This means that the authority and industry are not justified in not intervening 
because a causal connection between damage and source has not been 
conclusively established, i.e. .  Instead, they are supposed to act 
as soon as the probability of a causal connection is sufficiently high with respect 
to the potential harm in relation to the potential benefit.  
 
A major problem with the principle of well founded suspicion, however, is that 
neither a practical nor a formal rule has been defined in order to provide 
standards of conduct and accountability criteria for pharmaceutical marketing and 
policy. Differently put, no formal guidance is given as to how and where to set the 
relevant P-threshold. 
 
Indicators of suspicion are rather vague and prone to a biased interpretation, as 
the facts supporting the suspicion need not necessarily be concrete cases of 
damage. Also, the acquisition of new substantial theoretical knowledge can be a 
ground for risk suspicion, especially when there is little or no experience with the 
drug that could refute the theory (Di Fabio, 1993: 126-127). New theoretical 
insights might contribute to deeper pharmacological understanding and favour or 
contradict established knowledge about the effects of a specific substance (Di 
Fabio, 1993: 126-127; Räpple, 1991: 90-91); also, suspicion about potential 
damage begins as soon as a doctor assesses an association between a side 
effect and a drug (Di Fabio 1993: 125).  
 
Indeed, the above-mentioned cases of unjustifiably late product withdrawals 
testify that more detailed yardsticks should be provided to the responsible 
authority and industry so as to decrease arbitrariness in decision making and 
establish stronger accountability constraints.15 
 
Furthermore, it is advocated that in such a complex field as pharmacology, 
decisions be taken on the basis of all available evidence. A useful statistical 
paradigm for the integration of data coming from heterogeneous sources is 
constituted by the objective Bayesian methodology, to be discussed later in the 




knowledge of different experts, i.e. as a knowledge-integration platform (see 
Hughes et al., 2007, Cowell, 2007). 
 
3.2 Risk-benefit assessment  
 
Given the ambiguous character of pharmaceuticals and the consequent 
impossibility of absolute safety, the evaluation of drugs cannot result in a 
distinction between riskless and harmful products, but rather between an 
acceptable (―zumutbar‖) and an unacceptable (―unzumutbar‖) risk.16 A risk 
tolerance threshold is established such that, below the threshold, the drug is 
considered ―safe‖.   
 
This threshold is relative to the benefit expected from the drug through a risk-
benefit evaluation: this decides how much risk is to be accepted in the face of 
how much benefit. The risk-benefit assessment is made on the basis of known 
risks and benefits, therefore the proportion of ignorance surrounding the drug 
(epistemic uncertainty) is only indirectly relevant here. The risk-benefit evaluation 
is affected by ―ecological‖ uncertainty17 in the sense that pros and cons should be 
weighed against each other, and sometimes they are both equally strong. The 
main implication of this procedure is that, if the drug is approved, then the related 
risk is considered part of the bargain: this is called ―acceptable‖, ―tolerable‖, 
―unavoidable‖ or ―residual‖.  
 
The necessary condition for market approval is a positive result of risk-benefit 
assessment in ―absolute‖ terms—that is when no other drugs in the market 
compete with the candidate drug—as well as ―relative to‖ the pharmaceutical 
environment—that is in relation to the treatments already present in the market 
for the same indication.18  
 
This evaluation is based on a comparative weighting of therapeutic importance 
and efficacy on one side, and of risk severity and frequency on the other. The 
definition of risk traditionally adopted by safety regulations has been inherited 
from natural sciences and engineering and consists in the product of the two 
dimensions of damage—severity and probability—where the damage is any 
injury caused to goods protected by the law (Räpple, 1991: 49). 
 
In decision-theoretic terms, drug approval can be formalized as follows: 
.  
The expected utility (EU) of drug approval (D) should be higher than that of drug 
refusal (¬D), where both utilities are computed out of the formulae below.  
 
  
The expected utility of drug approval is the sum of the utility times probability 




ADRs). Attribute utilities have a positive sign for the drug benefits and a negative 
sign for the adverse drug reactions.  
 
 
The expected utility of drug rejection is the sum of the utility times probability 
products for all relevant attributes {j1…jn} associated with this option: the negative 
consequences of not treating the illness with the drug on one side, and the 
avoidance of drug side effects on the other.   
 
For any drug to be approved, the expected utility associated with it must be 
superior to that of not approving it. The ecological uncertainty affecting the risk-
benefit assessment increases to the extent that the difference among the 
inequality factors approaches zero; i.e., when EU(D) ≈ EU(¬D). This might be 
due to compensatory attributes present in both the risk and the benefit side. 
 
Whenever a new risk possibly associated to the drug is detected (development 
risk), a risk-benefit assessment needs to be made in order to determine whether 
this risk asks for intervention (for instance access restriction, approval 
suspension or product withdrawal) or not. If the risk-benefit balance remains 
favourable for the product, then the detected risk can be considered irrelevant. 
Instead, if the newly detected risk changes the risk-benefit balance so as to make 
it unfavourable, then appropriate measures need to be considered. Provided that, 
especially in the phase of signal generation, the causal connection between drug 
and ADR is uncertain, risk prevention/minimization measures should be 
determined by taking into account both the importance of the unbalance and by 
the evidence of causality.  
 
AMG § 5 prescribes that safety measures should be undertaken whenever there 
is well-founded suspicion that by adequate use, the drug will produce damaging 
effects exceeding a tolerable threshold: the greater the unbalance, the lower the 
probability of association between expected damage and candidate cause. 
However, this threshold cannot be just the unfavourable balance in the risk-
benefit, as this way the probability of the hypothesis of causal link between 
danger source and damage—which is the cornerstone of the principle of well-
founded suspicion—does not enter the decision to intervene or not. 
 
In the following two sections we propose that the precautionary criterion for 
safety intervention and pharmaceutical policy stated in § 5 of AMG be translated 
in the terms of the maximum entropy principle within an objective Bayesian 
approach. To state it informally, the principle of well-founded suspicion 
prescribes that the decision-maker believes in the existence of a causal link 
between drug and damage proportionally to the positive unbalance of the risk-
benefit assessment. In other words, the higher the unbalance of therapeutic 
benefit against suspected damage, the stronger the belief that there is a causal 




analysis alone that triggers action, but the belief in a (suspected) causal link 
between drug and damage, which is based on a risk-benefit analysis. 
 
4. Bayesian epistemology to rescue? 
 
In this section we suggest that Bayesian epistemology offers promising 
conceptual and formal tools for the principle of well-founded suspicion. As will 
become clearer in the discussion, the advantage of Bayesian epistemology, and 
in particular objective Bayesian epistemology, is twofold. First, objective 
Bayesianism allows us to deal with probabilistic inferences, particularly with 
those that are supposed to trigger action, such as pharmaceutical decisions. 
Second, objective Bayesianism reflects the precautionary stance that has to 
accompany causal attribution (for instance about the danger of a drug) and the 
decisions to be taken as a consequence of such attribution. 
 
4.1 A crash course in Bayesian epistemology 
 
Bayesianism is an epistemological position concerning scientific reasoning, but 
also reasoning more broadly construed.19 The core of Bayesianism has been 
formulated in the framework of the formal theory of probability. Thus, the two 
main assumptions behind Bayesianism are that (i) aspects of scientific 
reasoning, for instance, confirmation of a hypothesis or of a theory, can be 
quantified and constrained by the formal principles of probability theory; (ii) 
Bayesianism provides an account of how we should learn from experience. The 
formal apparatus of probability theory20 serves to impose coherence constraints 
on rational degrees of belief and, typically, uses conditionalisation as a 
fundamental probabilistic inference rule for updating probability values according 
to Bayes‘ theorem.21 Bayesianism is also taken to be a methodology that allows 
inductive reasoning from data, that is, probabilities of hypotheses in the light of 
data. Of course, not all reasoning in science is formalised in terms of probability 
theory nor is all reasoning inductive in character. The extent to which the core 
assumptions of Bayesianism really grasp the essential features of scientific 
reasoning goes beyond the scope of the present paper. What will be key for the 
following discussion is that Bayesianism explicitly deals with uncertain reasoning 
(which is exactly what happens in pharmaceutical contexts) and that, since it 
deals with how to learn from experience, a particular version of it (objective 
Bayesianism) will be useful when it comes to make decisions (such as in drug 
regulation). 
 
Bayesianism, as an epistemological position about scientific reasoning, is 
accompanied by an interpretation of probability in terms of rational degrees of 
belief. Here, probabilities are quantitative expressions of the strengths of an 
agent‘s beliefs. Such an interpretation was famously championed by de Finetti 
(1937) and Ramsey (1926), who analysed probabilities in terms of betting 
behaviour: probabilities are identified in terms of the betting odds that a rational 




formally argued (by means of the so-called ‗Dutch book theorems‘22) that 
conforming to the probability calculus is a necessary condition for rationality.  
 
According to strictly subjective Bayesian epistemology, it is sufficient that an 
agent‘s degrees of belief satisfy the axioms of probability. Other than that, the 
agent is free to adopt whichever degrees of belief she wished. The typical 
objection is that this account leads to arbitrariness: two agents may assign 
different probability values to the same event (given the same background 
information) and be equally rational, provided that they do not violate the axioms 
of probability. A solution to the objection of arbitrariness is attempted by 
empirically-based and objective Bayesian epistemology.  
 
In a nutshell, these two positions impose further constraints on an agent‘s 
degrees of belief before they can be deemed rational. Early proponents were 
Salmon (1967) and Jaynes (1957). There are two types of constraints: empirical 
and logical. Those constraints amount to taking into account any information and 
lack of information, when shaping degrees of belief.  
 
Salmon emphasises the role of empirical constraints and requires knowledge of 
relative frequencies to assign prior probability values. This characterises 
empirically-based subjective Bayesian epistemology. The frequency 
interpretation is yet another interpretation of probability, traditionally classed as 
an empirical or physical interpretation of probability. Physical probabilities, unlike 
Bayesian probabilities, take probabilities to be quantitative expressions of some 
features of the world, not of our knowledge or belief about them. A simple form of 
the frequency interpretation states that the probability of an attribute A in a finite 
reference class B is the relative frequency of the actual occurrence of A within B. 
Further developments of the frequency interpretation are due to von Mises 
(1928) and Reichenbach (1935), who considered infinite reference classes and 
identified probabilities with the limiting relative frequency of events or attributes 
therein.  
 
Jaynes (1957) goes beyond this empirically-based approach and puts forward a 
maximum entropy principle, which might be thought of as an extension of the 
principle of indifference.23 This is known as objective Bayesian epistemology. 
Thus, whilst empirically-based Bayesian epistemology contents itself with the 
adoption of empirical constraints, i.e. knowledge of observed frequencies is 
sufficient to shape degrees of belief, the objective Bayesian approach requires 
that both empirical and logical constraints be satisfied. Also, although both the 
empirically-based and objective Bayesian interpretations shape degrees of belief 
using knowledge of observed frequencies, the two interpretations significantly 
differ in that the objective Bayesian approach requires choosing the middling or 
most equivocal probability value in case of lack of evidence (e.g., concerning 
observed frequencies; see Williamson 2006). We shall explain objective 





It is worth noting that Bayesian interpretations, whether subjective, empirically-
based or objective, interpret single-case rather than generic probabilities. (On the 
other hand the frequency interpretation of probability only makes sense of 
probabilities of generic or repeatably-instantiatable outcomes.) In fact, degrees of 
belief are associated with bets and a bet in a generic outcome does not make 
sense. This turns out to be a useful feature of Bayesianism in general, because 
decisions in pharmaceutical contexts are single-case and therefore a Bayesian 
interpretation of probability ipso facto proves to be better suited than other 
approaches (notably, frequentism). 
 
4.2 Objective Bayesianism 
 
Objective Bayesianism has been subject to several criticisms since its inception 
by Edwin Jaynes (1957). The approach has been criticised for a variety of 
reasons, ranging from the foundational and motivational—e.g., it is hard to 
articulate how evidence constrains degrees of beliefs—to more technical ones—
e.g., a worry that using the maximum entropy principle engenders serious 
computational problems. Recently, the approach has been defended and 
developed by Williamson (2005, 2006 and 2010). The peculiar features of 
objective Bayesianism, in Williamson‘s approach, are the following. First, it 
doesn‘t require a separate updating rule, as probabilities can be determined 
afresh on each change of evidence (though updates are often consistent with the 
results of conditionalisation). Second, probabilities are not fully determined by 
evidence—language and context also play important role in shaping degrees of 
belief, and even when these are taken into account there may remain some room 
for subjective choice. Objective Bayesianism is characterised by three norms: the 
Probability Norm, the Calibration Norm, and the Equivocation Norm. Of the three, 
the Equivocation Norm is key to the suitability of the objective Bayesian 
framework formalising the principle of well-founded suspicion.  
 
Simply put, the Probability Norm says that an agent‘s degrees of belief should be 
representable by a probability function defined over the sentences of her 
language. The Calibration Norm states that those degrees of belief should fit with 
her evidence – in particular, should match empirical probabilities where known. 
Finally, the Equivocation Norm says that in case more than one probability 
function is compatible with evidence, the agent should choose one that is not too 
extreme – i.e., should choose one that equivocates sufficiently between the basic 
possibilities expressible in her language.  
 
The first norm would be unproblematically endorsed by all Bayesians; the second 
norm would certainly be endorsed by empirically-based Bayesians, since they 
require degrees of beliefs to be shaped upon available evidence. The third norm 
is what sets objective Bayesianism apart from other flavours of Bayesianism. It 
requires that the agent‘s probability function be sufficiently close to the 
equivocator, which is the probability function that gives the same probability to 




express elementary propositions 

A1,...,An. Then the basic possibilities (‗possible 
worlds‘) that she can express take the form ±A1∧⋯∧±An, where each instance of 
±Ai is either just Ai or its negation, iA . Distance between probability functions is 








Probability functions that are sufficiently close to the equivocator are those that 





As to what counts as sufficiently high entropy is a pragmatic question, guided by 
considerations to do with the required accuracy of predictions and so on. In the 
extreme case we have Jaynes‘ Maximum Entropy Principle, which says that the 
agent‘s degrees of belief should be representable by a probability function, from 
all those that are calibrated with evidence, that has maximum entropy. Since this 
is the standard formulation of objective Bayesianism, we shall presume this 
formulation in what follows. 
 
5. An objective Bayesian formalisation of the principle of well founded 
suspicion 
 
As we mentioned earlier, the principle of well-founded suspicion in 
pharmaceutical regulation can be considered as an instantiation of the 
precautionary principle.  The precautionary principle can be stated in very simple 
terms as follows: the decision to withdraw a drug should not wait until strong 
causal links between drug and harm are established with certainty, but action 
may follow already from the well-founded suspicion of causal link between the 
two. Before the sentence of the Contergan case (section 2), the German legal 
system required a proven causality nexus between danger source and possible 
damage in order to allow for administrative or punitive actions. As mentioned 
earlier, with the Contergan sentence, the legal system shifted from a danger 
avoidance system (Gefahrabwehr), where causal connection needs to be certain, 
to a risk prevention system (Risikovorsorge), where a hypothesis of causal 
connection suffices for intervention. According to the precautionary principle, 
then, withdrawal should be considered as soon as harm is suspected. Stated in 
these terms, the precautionary principle introduced into legal and administrative 
theory the concept of probabilistic causal links. 
 
Since according to the precautionary principle, the causal connection between 
danger source and effect need not be certain and scientifically proven, 




consideration, can be enforced before scientific proof is eventually provided. The 
threshold point for action is established by reference to the risk/benefit 
assessment on the one hand and to the probability of causal connection on the 
other: the higher the risk in comparison to the benefit, the lower the probability of 
causal connection between potential damage and suspected source can be in 
order to allow for risk prevention/minimization strategies. 
 
Now, there are several reasons why objective Bayesianism is a good candidate 
for formalising the principle. First, (health) technologies are always surrounded 
by a considerable amount of uncertainty in relation to their medium-long term 
effects. By providing a machinery of probabilistic inference, objective 
Bayesianism can put these considerations into practice. Second, the 
precautionary principle is very generally formulated, and even its pharmaceutical 
concretization, ―the principle of well-founded suspicion‖ does not provide any 
concrete reference point that can help to establish the tolerance threshold in a 
standard fashion. Withdrawal decisions are made on the basis of a consensus 
procedure grounded on empirical data, expert opinions and contextual factors 
(availability of alternative treatments, pressure of interest groups, influence of 
patient groups and public opinion): this may lead to biased procedures thwarting 
any precautionary effort. Third, objective Bayesianism formally takes into account 
not only all available evidence, but also lack of evidence, precisely in the spirit of 
the precautionary principle. This has to do with the Equivocation Norm. In the 
following we present how this works concretely.  
 
5.1 Precautionary principle, expected utility, and risk-benefit assessment  
 
Decisions concerning the approval, marketing, suspension, and withdrawal of 
pharmaceutical products are generally justified on the basis of a favourable (or 
unfavourable) risk-benefit balance. The expected benefits of a drug are weighed 
against its potential drawbacks and this comparison determines the decision 
outcome. In this respect, these decisions follow the general rule that an agent 
should act so as to maximise her expected utility. The example we propose 
below is by no means intended as the description of a particular case, but aims 
to provide a formalization which clearly distinguishes the different roles played by 
the risk-benefit evaluation (utilities) and by the causal assessment (probabilities 
associated with the various utilities) in risk management decisions, and thereby 
illustrates where the precautionary principle really intervenes along this process.   
 
Suppose a drug has been licensed for market. Consider variable D which takes 
value d if the drug is taken as prescribed and value ¬d otherwise. R signifies 
recovery (with values r and ¬r) and H signifies harm (taking value h if there is 
harm sufficient enough to warrant withdrawing a drug that caused that harm, and 
taking value ¬h otherwise). W signifies withdrawal of the drug from market (with 





Now since the drug has been licensed for market, there must be good evidence 
that 
(i) the drug positively causes recovery, written,  and 
(ii) the drug does not positively cause excessive harm, . 
 
(Here ‗positively causes‘ is taken as the opposite of ‗prevents‘, so that D causes 
R if and only if D positively causes R or D prevents R or is a mixed cause of R. A 
mixed cause sometimes positively causes and sometimes prevents.) Let us 
suppose that the evidence is such that the probability that the drug positively 
causes recovery reaches some threshold, , and that the 
probability that the drug does not positively cause harm reaches another 
threshold, , where  and  are small. 
 
Consider a utility matrix for withdrawing the drug, given the case in which the 
drug positively causes harm and the case in which the drug does not positively 
cause harm:24 
   
w 5 -10 
¬w -50 5 
 
If  then the expected utility of withdrawing the drug is 
 
 




According to the principle of maximising expected utility, one should withdraw the 







This is indeed a precautionary approach: if the probability that the drug positively 
causes harm is more than ¼, the drug should be withdrawn. Only a little 
evidence of positive causality is required for withdrawal; the causal claim need 
neither be established beyond reasonable doubt nor even on balance of 
probabilities. Note however that, so far, nothing has had to be said about what 
the probabilities mean. The precautionary principle itself is thus independent of 
the interpretation of probability. As we shall now see though, the implementation 






5.2 Objective Bayesianism and the precautionary principle 
 
In order to determine the conditions under which , an 
interpretation of probability and an interpretation of causality must be provided. 
And different interpretations will warrant different decisions. Since we are 
primarily interested in comparing interpretations of probability, let us take a 
simple probabilistic account of causality as our reference point: here  if 
and only if  for some state c of the other possible causes 
of H, and  for every other such state c’. (Accordingly a 
preventative lowers the probability of harm for some state c and raises it for 
none, while a mixed cause raises it in some contexts c and lowers it in others.)25 
Let us turn, then, to interpretations of probability.26  
 
So far, we know that , i.e., . Consider first 
the case in which .  
 
A physical interpretation of probability, such as the frequency theory, would deem 
the physical probability that the drug raises the physical probability of harm to be 
some undetermined point within the interval . Since some points within the 
interval would trigger withdrawal and others would not, no decision can be made 
as to whether to withdraw the drug. 
 
Consider next an empirically-based Bayesian interpretation of probability. Here 
an agent's rational degree of belief that the drug raises her rational degree of 
belief in harm is also some fixed point within the interval , but in this case the 
point in question is not out of reach of the agent—rather, the agent must simply 
choose some point within the interval. As long as the agent remains within the 
interval, all points are deemed equally rational. In this case a decision will be 
made as to whether to withdraw the drug, but the decision is entirely up to the 
subjective whim of the agent—it is not objectively determined as to which course 
should be taken. 
 
Finally, consider an objective Bayesian interpretation. According to this 
interpretation, an agent should believe that the drug positively causes harm to 
the degree within the interval  that is as equivocal as possible. Here, ‗as 
equivocal as possible‘ means as close as possible to the value given by the 
maximally equivocal probability function (the equivocator). As explained above, 
the equivocator gives each basic possibility that the agent can express the same 
probability. As the basic possibilities take the form , it equivocates 
as to whether  is greater or less than  for any state c 
of the other possible causes of H – i.e., the equivocator gives probability ½ that 
. If the agent supposes that there are k other causes of H, all binary 
variables, and therefore 2k states of such causes, the maximally equivocal 
function yields the probability that the drug positively causes harm to be . 




cause has probability .) Now there is a unique point in the interval 
 that is closest to . The decision for withdrawal should be taken 
according to whether this point is greater than or less than ¼. The objective 
Bayesian interpretation has the advantage, then, that a decision will be taken, 
and that decision is objectively determined by her evidence. 
 
Next consider the case in which . In this case all the interpretations 
considered above will license the decision not to withdraw the drug, since no 
probability in the interval  exceeds the level ¼ that triggers withdrawal. What 
sets the interpretations apart here is the case in which new evidence becomes 
available. Suppose that new evidence e increases the interval for  
from  to , where . As before, a physical interpretation will 
not license any decision. The empirically-based Bayesian interpretation will again 
license some decision, and this decision is objectively determined by the 
evidence and the agent's prior degrees of belief: if, when conditionalising on e, 
the agent's degree of belief in positive causation increases above ¼ then the 
decision to withdraw the drug will be warranted, otherwise the drug should be 
retained. Note, however, that the prior probabilities—including the probabilities 
conditional on the evidence—are entirely subjective, so the decision as to 
whether to withdraw remains entirely subjective. Finally the objective Bayesian 
will again withdraw according to whether   is greater than or less than ¼. 
In sum, then, the objective Bayesian interpretation has the same advantage in 
this case too: a decision will be taken, and that decision is objectively determined 
by the agent's evidence. 
 
In conclusion, the precautionary principle arguably follows from the principle that 
one should act as to maximise expected utility. But the implementation of this 
principle depends on how probabilities and causal relationships are interpreted. 
Under a standard probabilistic account of causality, a physical interpretation of 
probability suffers in that there are situations in which no decision can be taken. 
This is a problem because in a court of law a decision must be taken on the basis 
of available evidence. On the other hand, a subjective Bayesian interpretation of 
probability always licences a decision, but in certain circumstances the decision 
taken is entirely a matter of subjective choice. Thus this interpretation can also 
fail to provide normative guidance. But an objective Bayesian interpretation 
licenses a decision that depends on the evidence. Only on an objective Bayesian 
account, then, can the precautionary principle be implemented in an objective 
way. 
 
While we have presented this argument in the context of a specific utility table, it 
should be clear that the procedure is fully general. All that is required is that 
utilities can be set out in order to determine a threshold for withdrawal. 
 





Drug decisions are especially difficult to make because of the high goods at 
stake, because of the uncertainty surrounding both the pharmaceutical products 
as well as the health damage eventually produced by the disease, and because 
of the related difficulty to establish a risk tolerance threshold. Whenever new 
risks possibly associated with a drug are detected, then the question is raised as 
to whether these can be considered to be part of the bargain, and if not, whether 
they are indeed conditioned by drug intake. According to the principle of well-
founded suspicion, the causal nexus between drug and harm need not be certain 
in order for safety measures (such as new labeling or product retirement) to be 
enforced. Indeed, following the precautionary principle, the probability of a causal 
connection can be as low as the possibly associated harm is supposed or known 
to be severe. Thus the probability of the causal link constitutes the critical 
measure for intervention, together with the harm suspected to be associated with 
the drug. Provided that the former falls within a given interval, objective 
Bayesianism provides the formal tools for determining, within this interval, the 
probability value that is maximally equivocal, thereby grounding the decision both 
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 For instance, information duties towards the public as well as towards the administrative 
authorities, quality controls both at the level of product design and manufacture, or privilege 
restrictions in the trial procedure for tort, strict or criminal liability. Restrictive norms have 
sometimes been accompanied by deontology codes of self-regulation from the side of the 
industry (Scheu, 2003: 59-60). See for instance in Germany the BPI-Code of conduct 
(Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie: Federal Association of Pharmaceutical 
Industries).  
2 
For a historical contextualization of this evolution see Scheu, 2003. A fundamental reference to 
the evolution of risk regulation is Di Fabio, 1994. 
3
 See in this respect the report of the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) 
on benefit-risk assessment methods in the context of the evaluation of marketing authorization 
applications of medical products for human use /Doc. Ref. EMEA/CHMP/15404/2007) where it is 
recommended to ―explore further development of methodologies for benefit/risk analysis, 
including a wide range of quantitative and semiquantitative tools‖ (p. 2). The document insists that 
―Quantitative approaches to benefit-risk assessment might also be useful for the continuous 
evaluation of products post-approval‖ (p.6) and that ―There can be a number of theoretical and 
practical aspects of decision-making theory that can be useful to refine the CHMP assessment‖. It 
is furthermore acknowledged that ―Most of these methods are still in the research domain and 
their validity and usefulness remain to be tested in various contexts‖ (p.4): 
http://www.emea.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Regulatory_and_procedural_guideline
/2010/01/WC500069634.pdf. Another important document in this sense is the Report of CIOMS 
Woking Group IV (Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, Geneva 1998) 
―Benefit-Risk Balance for Marketed Drugs: Evaluating Safety Signals‖: 
http://www.cioms.ch/publications/g4-benefit-risk.pdf, which also advances the use of formal 
decision theory in the decision-making process (p. 5) and recognizes the lack of generally agreed 
procedures or regulatory guidelines for conducting and acting upon benefit-risk assessment as 




                                                                                                                                            
provide ―techniques that are expected to yield a reproducible and transparent quantification and 
descriptions of risk attributable to drugs‖ (p. 35).  
4 
Landesgericht (LG) Aachen, 18. 12. 1970 – 4 KMs 1/68, 15 – 115/67: Juristische Zeitung 507 
(521).  
5
 LG Aachen, 18. 12. 1970 – 4 KMs 1/68, 15 – 115/67: Juristische Zeitung 516. 
6
 LG Aachen, 18. 12. 1970 – 4 KMs 1/68, 15 – 115/67: Juristische Zeitung 516. 
7
 Scheu, 2003: 755. 
8
 § 1 AMG: ―Es ist der Zweck dieses Gesetzes, im Interesse einer ordnungsgemäßen 
Arzneimittelversorgung von Mensch und Tier für die Sicherheit im Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln, 
insbesondere für die Qualität, Wirksamkeit und Unbedenklichkeit der Arzneimittel nach Maßgabe 
der folgenden Vorschriften zu sorgen―.  
9
 Authority for intervention is linked to this norm throughout the law: § 25 II S 1. Nr. 5 (approval) in 
connection with § 28 (special conditions), § 30 (approval withdrawal, revocation, suspension), 
and § 69 I S. 2 Nr. 4 (risk management interventions). Hart, 1998b: 168.  
10
 § 5 II: ―Bedenklich sind Arzneimittel, bei denen nach dem jeweiligen Stand der 
wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse der begründete Verdacht besteht, dass sie bei 
bestimmungsgemäßem Gebrauch schädliche Wirkungen haben, die über ein nach den 




 German Medicine Act 1976 (Arzneimittelgesetz 1976);  see also Scheu, 2003: 701. 
13
 See the Enquete-Kommissions-Bericht ―Schutz des Menschen und der Umwelt‖: BT-DrS. 
12/8260, cited in Scheu, 2003: 72. In addition to inherent epistemological limits, Scheu also 
mentions the objective information insufficiency regarding the risk profile of chemical products in 
general. For most of the chemical products on the market, fundamental data about chemical 
behavior and environmental consequences of their use are simply not available (Scheu, 2003: 80; 
see also Abraham, 2005). 
14
 This evolution is the reflection of the development of the precautionary principle in different 
fields of technological risk regulation. See Di Fabio, 1994. See also Dettling, 2005: 165. 
15
 A proposal in this direction has also been put forward by Waller & Evans (2002) for instance. 
16
 See also Räpple, 1991: 50-57. 
17
 This kind of uncertainty is termed ―ecological‖ because it is not primarily originated by lack of 
knowledge but by an intrinsic indecision due to a preference tie-up (see also Osimani 2010, 
forthcoming and Delquié, 2008).  
18
 See a.o. Hart, 2005; Osimani 2007 (chapter 2).  
19
 The mathematical and philosophical literature on probability, the interpretation of probability, 
and Bayesianism is indeed vast. The unfamiliar but interested reader may look at the following 
references: Davidson (1981), Dubucs (1993), Eagle (2009), Gillies (2002), Howson and Urbach 
(1993), Williamson (2005 and 2010). 
20
 In spite of its long history, probability theory was axiomatized by Kolmogorov only in 1933. 
21
 In probability theory, the axioms state that (i) probabilities are non-negative real numbers, (ii) 
every tautology is assigned value 1, and (iii) the sum of the probabilities of two mutually 
inconsistent sentences is equal to the probability of their disjunction. The conditional probability of 
A given B is written P(A|B)  and is defined as  P(A|B)= P(A&B)/P(B) for nonzero P(B). Bayes‘ 
theorem follows from the axioms and from the definition of conditional probability.  It governs the 
inversion of a conditional probability and relates the posterior probability of B given A to the 
probability of A given B, provided that the prior probability of A and B are known or that a 
conventional procedure to determine them is accepted. Formally, Bayes‘ theorem states that: 
P(B|A) = P(A|B)P(B)/P(A) for nonzero P(A). Priors are probability values assigned to an event or 
hypothesis in the absence of evidence or before evidence is collected. Posterior probabilities are 
then probability values computed by means of Bayes‘ theorem taking into account evidence. See 
Howson and Urbach (1993) for a detailed exposition.  
22 
See, e.g., de Finetti (1937). 
23
 The principle of indifference states that whenever there is no evidence favouring one basic 




                                                                                                                                            
24 
This analysis supposes that the decision as to whether or not to withdraw the drug is taken 
solely on the basis of whether or not the drug is a positive cause of harm that is sufficiently great. 
But this analysis can be extended straightforwardly to decisions taken on the basis of whether the 
drug is a cause of harm that is sufficiently great (so that mixed causation is also taken into 
account). The utilities can be calculated via a variety of risk-benefit protocols (see also footnote 3 
and related literature). In general, prolongation of life expectancy is one of the most common 
parameters considered in health technology assessment. More precisely, technologies are 
evaluated in terms of quality adjusted life expectancy. In the case of pharmaceutical 
products following parameters are taken into account. On the benefit side: efficacy, therapeutic 
importance, healing, symptoms relief, transitory vs permanent positive effect. On the risk side: 
severity, intensity, extension, duration (risk magnitude), risk type, severity of impact on life quality, 
reversibility, controllability, possibility of (early) detection, possible countermeasures. All these 
parameters jointly contribute to the final approval decision. A formal procedure should therefore 
aggregate them and weight them by the probability of the benefit and the risk respectively. The 
decision matrix proposed here is an ideal formalization of this procedure which only serves the 
theoretical purpose of showing where exactly the precautionary principle comes to its own. 
25
 This kind of probabilistic analysis is in fact over-simplistic, as argued in Russo and Williamson 
(2007); Williamson (2009) and Russo and Williamson (2011). But it will serve our purposes as a 
simple reference point with which to compare interpretations of probability. 
26
 The following analysis supposes that probabilities are all given the same interpretation, but can 
be extended to pluralistic accounts of probability. 
 
